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Preface
In this brief, Research Scholar Greg Hannsgen and I focus on the
risks  and  possibilities  ahead  for  the  US  economy.  Using  a
Keynesian approach and drawing from the commentary of other
observers, we analyze publicly available data in order to assess
the strength and durability of the expansion that probably began
in 2009. We focus on four broad groups of markets that have
shown signs of stress for the last several years: financial markets,
markets for household goods and services, commodity markets,
and labor markets. This kind of analysis does not yield numeri-
cal forecasts of economic variables but may unearth important
clues about the short-term outlook for the country’s economic
well-being, in the narrow sense of output and income. 
Like Milton Friedman before them, most modern-day aca-
demic opponents of fiscal stimulus have argued that monetary
policy easing will fail to keep real interest rates low as long as
governments are putting great demands on capital markets. This
theory has not been borne out in practice following the expan-
sionary  policy  response  to  the  Great  Recession,  which  has
reduced the yields of low-risk, short-term securities and resulted
in lower rates for other types of issues and loans crucial to cor-
porate bottom lines. Interest rates are at historical lows—one of
many signs that monetarist scenarios leading to high inflation
are not being played out—and both monetary easing and fiscal
stimulus have had some impact on demand by the US sector that
is financially weakest: the household sector. Inflation-adjusted
measures of the volume of household expenditures, including
retail sales and personal consumption expenditures, sustained
positive growth rates from midsummer of 2010 to year’s end.
Unfortunately, the growth rate of personal consumption expen-
ditures turned slightly negative in January, and retail sales have
not been strong in the first two months of this year. 
In addition, seasonally adjusted industrial production was
flat in February, and real earnings growth has been meager at
best since the recovery began. In the aftermath of a severe reces-
sion, a modest-to-severe financial retrenchment, marked by
tightened lending standards, an increased aversion to indebted-
ness, and more conservative investment tactics, tends to occur
almost by necessity—as Hyman Minsky observed. Overall, con-
sumer credit has yet to expand after stagnating in 2007–09,
though the bleak picture painted by recent data on credit-card
debt levels was offset by the attainment of a new record for non–
credit card consumer debt—approximately $1.6 trillion. 
In Europe, the banking system has been threatened by the
sovereign debt crisis, and numerous institutions with large hold-
ings of government bonds are not yet out of the woods. The
banking industries in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain are
surviving only by depositing securities worth hundreds of bil-
lions of euros at the European Central Bank, in return for cash.
The long-run presence of financial fragility looms large in our
view, compared to the supposedly excessive demands for capital
generated by high government deficits. 
Although the dollar’s value against the major foreign cur-
rencies still seems to be trending downward, recent data show
that the trade deficit widened by about $6 billion in January, to
$46 billion, largely due to increases in the cost of imported oil. In
the broader commodities market, the prices for corn, soybeans,
cotton, and cattle have made double-digit and triple-digit gains
over the past year. If commodity prices climb broadly and
sharply, the Fed could face the prospect of a serious episode of
cost-push inflation similar to the one that occurred during much
of the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Unfortunately, the labor market is ill positioned to deal with
a double whammy of rising commodity prices and a monetary-
policy tightening. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate
stood at 8.9 percent in February, reflecting only a tiny drop from
the January level of 9.0 percent, and labor market data show
every sign of a widespread and severe weakness in aggregate
demand. Unless there is new resolve for effective government
action on the jobs front, drastic cuts in much-needed federal,
state, and local programs will be the order of the day in the
United States as in much of Europe. The bottom line: markets
cannot be counted on to solve a long-lasting macroeconomic cri-
sis like ours in the absence of firm monetary stimulus, jobs pro-
grams, and other public sector initiatives. 
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
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An Approach to Analyzing Current Economic
Problems
To begin with the conventional wisdom, most government and
private sector forecasters foresee solid but moderate growth over
the next two years or so. For example, the Fed reported in
January that most of its regional bank presidents and board
members expect GDP to grow 3.4 percent this year and 3.9 per-
cent in 2012 (Federal Reserve 2011b). On the other hand, it has
become almost a cliché to point out that improvement in the
labor market is lagging behind the recovery in output growth.
The Fed’s forecasts of the unemployment rate range from 8.8 to
9.0 percent for this year and from 7.6 to 8.1 percent for 2012.
These forecasts do not differ greatly from other widely reported
forecasts and projections, and the “beige book” reports on indi-
vidual geographic regions did not seem to be greatly at odds with
these earlier forecasts.  
This analysis focuses on the risks and possibilities ahead for
the US economy.1 We use a Keynesian framework, in which the
strength of demand for goods and services matters a great deal
more than most observers seem to realize, even after years of high
unemployment. We consider the strength and durability of the
weak expansion that appears to have begun in 2009 and consider
various diagnoses for the weak US labor market using publicly
available data and commentary, as well as the perspective offered
by the work of Keynes and his followers. We focus on data related
to four markets that have shown signs of stress for most of the
last several years: financial markets, markets for household goods
and  services,  commodity  markets,  and  labor  markets.  This
approach does not yield numerical forecasts of economic vari-
ables but it will help us to obtain some clues about the short-
term outlook for the country’s economic well-being, in the
narrow sense of output and income. It will also cast light on
some longer-run threats that will be important over the next five
years or so and indeed have the potential to wreak economic
havoc during that time. In particular, dangers and stresses in the
financial and banking systems are presently very serious, though
they are difficult to measure and forecast in precise terms. The
paper ends with some ideas about macroeconomic policies
appropriate to our time. 
Market No. 1, Finance and Banking: Minskyan
Instability Is the Real Threat 
There are still many observable but scattered stresses in impor-
tant European financial markets, where rising and sometimes
unstable yields draw the attention of regulators and central
bankers. Some observers seem to assume that large budget
deficits and loose monetary policy are causing things to get out
of hand in these markets, but the recent financial crisis seems to
have led to less restrictive policy, rather than vice versa. The infla-
tionary scenarios envisioned for years by monetarist and “new
classical” economists have not materialized in a convincing way,
though important problems involving money and deficits are
evident. 
More to the point, many observers worry about stresses that
are building in some credit markets and financial institutions,
with little help from the public sector. They worry that if left
unchecked, these problems could lead to a moment of truth sim-
ilar to but more profound than the “Minsky moment” of 2008–
09. As in that crisis, current threats to the financial system mostly
involve loans, derivatives, and securities that were created and
sold by private financial companies and permitted rather than
demanded by the Fed, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and other regulators. 
The main concern of deficit skeptics is a possible drain on
capital markets that would sap resources that could be used more
productively by the private sector. Anti-Keynesian commenta-
tors see deficits leading to higher interest rates and taxes over
some unspecified long run, a development that would in their
view greatly hinder growth within a year or two after fiscal stim-
ulus. As we will see below, however, interest rates are low by his-
torical standards. This is one of many signs that monetarist
scenarios leading to high inflation or hyperinflation are not being
played out. These observations must be kept in mind when iso-
lated data points or events in a few sectors are taken as empiri-
cal  support  for  critiques  of  policy  activism  that  rely  upon 
the quantity theory of money and other traditional economic
doctrines.   
Consumer spending, it is often noted, accounts for more
than one-half of GDP. Standards for loans to the private sector
tightened greatly during the financial crisis but have since loos-
ened a great deal, according to data from the Fed’s survey of sen-
ior loan officers (see Figure 1). Now, in sharp contrast to the
situation that has prevailed for most of the last three years, less
than half of surveyed banks are tightening credit standards.Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
Overall, consumer credit has yet to expand after stagnating dur-
ing the Great Recession (again, see Figure 1), though the bleak
picture painted by recent data on credit-card debt levels as of
February was offset somewhat by the attainment of a new record
for  the  total  amount  of  non–credit  card  consumer  debt—
approximately $1.6 trillion (Norris 2011a).2 While the data
reflect large numbers of loan write-offs, it is likely that weak
credit card lending arises mostly from low demand among peo-
ple with adequate credit scores who wish to make major house-
hold  purchases.  Similarly,  credit  is  rarely  of  great  help  to
businesses in conditions that typify the aftermath of a severe
recession: widespread bankruptcies, weak household balance
sheets, and reduced real earnings. Also, in such circumstances, a
modest-to-severe financial retrenchment, marked by tightened
lending standards, an increased aversion to indebtedness, and
more conservative investment tactics, tends to occur almost by
necessity (Minsky 2008 [1986]). It goes without saying that these
sometimes useful repercussions of financial overextension on the
part of households help explain our bias in favor of macroeco-
nomic policies that do not depend on the encouragement of a
new private sector credit boom. At the Levy Institute, we began
emphasizing this in the 1990s with warnings about the credit-
fueled and imbalanced domestic economy of the era, which had
developed in concert with insufficient government spending and
high levels of foreign borrowing (Godley and Wray 1999).  
And not only that, bull markets have developed around the
world, making cheap credit available to borrowers who have
access to the “hottest” but perhaps most volatile sources of fund-
ing. In domestic bond markets, some have noted a boom in the
issuance of “junk” bonds, investments that had again become
unpopular because of the recession and the resulting increase in
default rates for firms that may not have been very sound to
begin with (Financial Times 2011a; Van Duyn 2011). Yields for
securities  with  ratings  somewhat  below “investment  grade”
remain low despite continuing concern and uncertainty over the
state of the economy (Figure 2). The red line in the figure
approximates the difference, or spread, between the yield to
maturity of a typical 30-year corporate bond with a Baa rating
and the yield for a Treasury bond of a similar maturity. This
spread is not unusually wide and has continued a long-lived
downward trend in recent months, making it easier for compa-
nies without investment-grade bond ratings to raise funds in
capital markets, should they have business in need of financing.
A similar yield spread for true junk bonds—corporate securities
of the lowest quality—stood at approximately 2.69 percent in
early March, not far above its 2007 low of 2.41 percent (Van
Duyn 2011).
Some observers and critics of current monetary policy
worry that inflation will soon take off, leading to a run on long-
term, fixed-income investments such as bonds issued by the fed-
eral government. Figure 3 shows the “yield curve” for Treasury
securities of various maturities in February 2011 as well as the
same curve as it appeared exactly one year earlier. Monetary
stimulus has been effective in reducing rates at most maturities,
Figure 1 Consumer Credit Indicators
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Figure 2 Corporate Bond Yield and Yield Spread 
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partly as a result of the “unconventional” but almost surefire Fed
policy of purchasing long-maturity bonds. Some careful studies
suggest that recent policy actions have had only a small effect on
long-term rates, but the Fed now holds a portfolio worth over
$2.5 trillion, compared to around $870 billion at the beginning
of March 2008 (Federal Reserve 2011a). The newer holdings
include some assets acquired from failing financial corporations,
when few potential buyers for their assets could be found, as well
as mortgage bonds and Treasury securities of short and long
maturity. Of course, a sudden sale of all of these securities would
destabilize some important financial markets and lead to signif-
icantly higher yields. 
On the other hand, many central banks, regulators, and
accounting firms find themselves in the position of at least tem-
porarily overlooking serious problems with asset quality and
capital  adequacy  at  financial  institutions  around  the  world
(Financial Times2010, 2011b; Weil 2011). Worldwide regulatory
changes about to go into effect may change the profitability of
many large banks for the worse (Financial Times 2010, 2011b).
In Europe, the banking system has been threatened by the sov-
ereign debt crisis, and numerous institutions with large holdings
of government bonds are not yet out of the woods. The banking
industries in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain are surviving
only by depositing securities worth hundreds of billions of euros
at the European Central Bank (ECB), in return for cash. As of
December 2010, these loans were equivalent in value to 37 per-
cent of GDP in Greece, 68 percent in Ireland, 24 percent in
Portugal, and 4 percent in Spain. The long-run presence of finan-
cial fragility looms large in our view, compared to the supposedly
excessive demands for capital generated by high government
deficits. The case for this perspective on risks to the economy
goes beyond data showing that nominal yields on US govern-
ment debt are relatively low and stable.
Inflation is often regarded as the chief enemy of bondhold-
ers, one of many links that connect controversies about macro-
economic policy to concerns about the cost and availability of
finance and capital. To wit, critics of Keynesian policies argue
that recent deficits and monetary policy actions will inevitably
lead to an increase in inflation that not only angers consumers,
but also ultimately raises nominal interest rates for mortgages
and business loans. Defying recent arguments to this effect, the
data in Figure 4 show that inflation at the level of the consumer
remains very much in check, with no upward trend after the pas-
sage of three fiscal stimulus packages and more than two years of
near-zero short-term interest rates. In January, headline personal
consumption expenditure inflation was 3.5 percent, while the
annual rate of inflation in consumer prices excluding food and
energy items was only 1.5 percent. These inflation rates rose in
February data, but other key data released in March suggest that
the economy is stagnating or weakening further. Moreover,
Figure 3 Yield Curve for Treasury Securities, February 2010
and February 2011
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month-on-month inflation data tend to be rather volatile, as
shown in the figure.  
Moreover, despite the Fed’s seemingly lax stance against
inflation, the yield spread separating yields on inflation-indexed
Treasury securities from those available on nonindexed Treasury
securities of the same maturity has remained almost constant
(Figure 5). In other words, people who wish to obtain securities
whose returns are insulated from the effects of inflation are pay-
ing only slightly more for inflation protection than they were
about one year ago. This flatness in inflation premiums indicates
that there has not been a sharp increase in investor demand for
such insurance for government bonds. Those who purchase
securities for long-term investment purposes evidently have not
greatly revised their forecasts of inflation following recent policy
actions. This is reassuring, because in those countries where
inflation is quite high, inflation premiums are closely watched
and volatile, and almost all investors prefer inflation-protected
investments to ordinary fixed-income assets. Hence, evidence on
inflation premiums paid in bond markets indicates that fears of
inflation are not putting upward pressure on yields. This chart
and other evidence in this brief indicate that many of the wide-
spread concerns of the past few years about President Obama’s
policies were grossly misplaced. 
Another insight into the weakness of policy critiques that
condemn government borrowing can be gained by studying
bond  markets  in  countries  that  have  strongly  expanding
economies and relatively high interest rates. Far from suggesting
that “saving is in short supply,” the performance of some finan-
cial markets in rapidly growing economies has raised concerns
about the possible emergence of new and dangerous financial
bubbles. Such worries have led some governments in Asia and
Latin America to impose restrictions on capital movement,
designed to stem appreciation of their currencies. High returns
and growing economies have been sufficient to attract more than
enough capital in the eyes of local authorities.  
Since the financial crisis, central banks have managed to ease
conditions in many developed-country credit markets. Like
Milton Friedman (1968) before them, most modern-day aca-
demic opponents of fiscal stimulus have argued that monetary
policy aggressiveness will fail to keep real interest rates low as
long as governments are putting great demands on the capital
markets. By the lights of conventional theory, short-term nom-
inal interest rates can be changed at will by either the govern-
ment  or  the  central  bank,  but  real  rates  gravitate  toward
equilibria that are independent of the veil of money and prices
(Woodford 2003, 248). Moreover, demands on capital markets
by the public sector increase these “natural” interest rates. Hence,
once the Fed lowers interest rates, it sets in motion a process
whereby accelerating inflation eventually brings real rates back to
their original levels in the absence of changes to the equilibrium. 
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Figure 6 Monthly Indicators of Household Expenditures
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This theory has not been borne out in practice following the
policy response to the Great Recession. As we saw before, rounds
1 and 2 of quantitative easing (QE) and recent reductions in the
federal funds rate have not generated unintended impacts on
inflation sufficient to reverse the effects of monetary policy eas-
ing on real yields. More generally, expansionary policy has not
only reduced the yields of low-risk, short-term securities, but it
has also resulted in lower rates for other types of issues and loans
crucial to corporate bottom lines. Hence, it is not surprising that
Fed Chairman Bernanke’s public statements still give no hint that
he plans to call off the Fed’s recent “unconventional” policy
actions before their scheduled end date in June (Hilsenrath and
Crittenden 2011). This increases our confidence in the stability
of the financial system.  
The Market for Goods and Services: Stronger, but
Not Strong Enough
Perhaps indicating that recent policy has been somewhat suc-
cessful, many signs have appeared of an ongoing expansion in
the demand for goods and services produced in the United
States. In particular, both monetary easing and fiscal stimulus
have had some impact on demand by the US sector that is finan-
cially weakest: the household sector. We saw above that credit
standards for this sector appear to have eased significantly fol-
lowing  Fed  intervention  in  a  number  of  financial  markets,
including those for some types of securities backed by consumer
loans. Evidence of a modest recovery is readily available: inflation-
adjusted measures of the volume of household expenditures,
including retail sales and personal consumption expenditures,sus-
tained positive growth rates from midsummer of 2010 until the
end of last year (Figure 6). In particular, an easing of credit terms
and standards for auto loans may have helped drive an 11 percent
increase in new car sales in 2010 (Dash 2011). Unfortunately, the
growth  rate  of  personal  consumption  expenditures  turned
slightly negative in January, and retail sales have not been strong
in the first two months of this year. 
This leads us to the Fed’s index of industrial production,
which has mostly been growing smartly after sustaining a fall of
17 percent in the months between September 2007 and June
2009. Figure 7 shows that seasonally adjusted industrial produc-
tion was flat in February and has still not attained its earlier peak.
This disappointing announcement follows hard on the heels of
January’s encouraging 2.9 percent annual growth rate for indus-
trial production. 
In light of the constraints on US consumers discussed in the
section on financial markets, much hope resides in the export
sector of American commerce, where, unfortunately, the signs
Figure 7 Industrial Sector Production Recovery
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Figure 8 Narrowing of the Current Account Deficit,
2005Q1−2010Q4
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Transactions Accounts;












































Federal Reserve’s Broad Trade-weighted Exchange Rate Index (right scale)
Current Account Balance, Excluding Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum 
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have not been strongly and consistently positive. Of course, there
has been some progress since pundits began to warn seriously
that trade deficits might soon surpass 10 percent of GDP. The
current account includes not only goods and services that are
traded across international borders, but also income payments,
such as interest and dividends on foreign investments. The bal-
ance in these transactions has improved from a deficit of about
minus 6.5 percent of GDP in the last quarter of 2005 to levels
consistently above minus 4 percent of GDP since the beginning
of 2009 (Figure 8).  However, the deficit has been gradually dete-
riorating over most of the past two years or so and stood at
minus 3.0 percent of GDP as of the fourth quarter of 2010.
Imbalances  of  this  magnitude  have  contributed  to  rapid,
unwanted capital inflows in many emerging-market economies,
as mentioned above. 
Nonetheless, there are still signs of hope in this regard. As
shown in the same figure, the Fed’s trade-weighted exchange-
rate index for the dollar’s value against major foreign currencies
still seems to be on a downward trajectory, a trend that was 
reinforced by rising interest rates overseas following the ECB’s
intimation that it would begin tightening its policy stance. The
dollar has also depreciated somewhat vis-à-vis the Chinese cur-
rency, a development that will be helpful to US GDP economic
growth, especially when its effect is combined with increased
inflationary pressures in much of Asia. Such trends, which depre-
ciate the dollar in real terms, tend to make US exports less expen-
sive for foreign buyers and raise the price of imports sold in the
United States.  
Recent monthly data show that the trade deficit widened by
about $6 billion in January, to $46 billion, a disappointing result
that was largely due to increases in the cost of imported petro-
leum. One should keep in mind a rule of thumb asserting that
each $1 billion reduction in the US trade deficit leads to a 0.1
percent  increase  in  GDP  (Chinn  2011).  President  Obama’s
annual State of the Union address focused largely on national
competitiveness in technology, a somewhat helpful nod toward
the obvious importance of trade and other key economic issues
affected by the quality of the educational system and the state of
science and technology in this country.   
An Old Nemesis: The Markets for Raw Materials,
Energy, and Other Commodities
The topic of recent oil-price increases, and their effects on out-
put, brings to mind the broader market for commodities such
as corn, soybeans, cotton, and cattle, where prices have been
climbing rapidly. There has been a general rise in recent months
in the spot and forward prices of many agricultural and other
commodities. For example, cotton futures have risen 162 per-
cent over the past year, reaching an all-time high in February,
while many other commodity prices have made double-digit and
triple-digit gains in that timespan (Farchy 2011). Such volatility
has been known to pose a threat to financial stability, as there is
an enormous volume of trading each day on the commodity
markets and related financial derivatives markets. 
This run-up in commodity prices has already had an unfor-
tunate impact on levels of extreme poverty and hunger in many
countries (World Bank 2011). Even in the developed world,
increases in the prices of food, energy, and materials can crowd
out other kinds of expenditures from consumers’ budgets before
serious headline inflation appears. For now, real weekly earnings
for full-time employees, as estimated by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), have remained very stable over the past five years,
lending support to the notion that commodity price inflation
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has not been making a big dent in US standards of living during
that time (Figure 9). However, one can see a dramatic effect 
on the amount of agricultural commodities that can be pur-
chased with the median weekly paycheck. Illustrating this trend,
Figure 9 shows nominal earnings divided by the producer price
subindex for grains. This “grain earnings” series gives one the
sense that consumers are likely to be feeling a strain at the super-
market checkout lane when they buy items made from wheat,
corn, and other cereal grains. Increases in commodity prices also
adversely affect firms’ production costs, which is one reason
commodity inflations like the current one have tended to pro-
mote overall inflation and hinder growth at the same time.   
Many economists dismiss popular concerns that recent rises
in raw materials prices could spur an increase in inflation, on the
grounds  that  in  high-income  countries,  these  commodities
account for only a small share of GDP. And not only that, most
mainstream  academic  macroeconomists  and  policy  officials
believe that increases in these prices will not start an ongoing 
consumer-price inflation as long as the Fed maintains a credible
monetary policy strategy, one that commits policymakers in one
way or another to a fight against core inflation that could come at
great cost to output and employment (Barro and Gordon 1983;
Calvo 1978; Kydland and Prescott 1977; Rogoff 1985). It is not
always appreciated in the political discourse that this high-level
confidence that inflation is contained arises from a modern eco-
nomic theory, and certainly not from an extreme fealty to the
Keynesian school of macroeconomics or from long and successful
experience with the current Fed’s monetary policy doctrine.
The aforementioned “modern” view on inflation contain-
ment, which rests on the importance of “time consistent” policy,
may prove incorrect if challenged by one or more severe supply
shocks. In fact, Alan Blinder and Jeremy Rudd (2008) deny that
the supposedly permanent taming of inflation and moderation
of the business cycle that was touted in the mid-1980s can be
attributed mostly to improved policymaking. Instead, they argue
that improved US economic performance during much of the
1980s and 1990s was largely the result of good luck in avoiding
shocks to the price of oil and other commodities. A run-up in
commodity prices in the 2000s proved less damaging to the econ-
omy than the oil and food price shocks of the 1970s for a variety
of reasons, especially the adaptation of the economy to higher
resource costs. In case these mitigating circumstances do not pre-
vail in this decade, and commodity prices climb broadly and
sharply, one might gather that the Fed could face the prospect of
a serious episode of cost-push inflation, similar to the one that
occurred during much of the 1970s and early 1980s. Chairman
Bernanke might then find himself in the position of a new-era
Paul Volcker, committed to raising interest rates drastically, until
inflation abated to some unhelpfully low target range. Such a
policy response might be far more injurious to output and job
creation than an isolated commodity-price inflation with no
subsequent monetary policy response. Unfortunately, the labor
market is ill positioned to deal with a double whammy from ris-
ing commodity prices and a monetary-policy tightening, as
employers are only just beginning to get back to form in the wake
of the 2007−09 recession.  
The Vexed Labor Market and Stubborn
Unemployment Rate
We now turn to this issue, which continues to vex the US econ-
omy. As shown in Figure 10, BLS household survey data show
that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate stood at 8.9 per-
cent in February, reflecting only a tiny drop from the previous
month’s level of 9.0 percent. According to the BLS’s separate sur-
vey of businesses, payrolls rose by 192,000 workers in February.
Figure 10 puts these data in perspective, demonstrating that the
Figure 10 BLS Unemployment Indicators
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Note: All series seasonally adjusted by BLS.
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economy has not even begun to reverse the steep rise that
occurred from 2008 to 2009 in four gauges of the extent and
severity of the US unemployment problem. Along with the tra-
ditional measure of unemployment, the figure shows large and
enduring increases in the median length of time people have
been unemployed, in the percentage of workers who have been
unemployed for more than 27 weeks, and in the BLS’s U–6 labor
underutilization measure, which adds to the standard unem-
ployment rate the percentage of the labor force that is either out
of work but not searching for a job or involuntarily working less
than full time. The most recent data point in this latter gauge was
15.9 percent, representing more than one in seven civilian work-
ers wishing that they could find more work in the labor market.
February’s survey data followed a more ambiguous and
somewhat confusing set of data that was summarized in the pre-
vious month’s BLS employment report. Offering some hope that
the job market was recovering more quickly than expected,
January household survey data indicated a sharp decline from
the previous month’s figure in the traditional version of the
unemployment rate, but this apparent improvement was largely
the product of seasonal adjustment procedures that are routinely
applied to results from BLS surveys. In fact, January’s reported
fall in the unemployment rate to 9.0 percent from 9.4 percent
last December could be accounted for almost entirely by seasonal
adjustment;  in  other  words,  many  lost  their  jobs  between
December 2010 and January 2011, but these losses were omitted
from headline BLS figures because large numbers of layoffs, et
cetera, are normal for that time of year. 
Following the release of the report, many economic com-
mentators focused on what seemed to be a puzzling discrepancy
between data obtained via the household survey and data from
the same month’s survey of business establishments (Economix
Editors  2011).  When  seasonal  adjustments  are  removed,  it
becomes clear that these two data sources were actually in agree-
ment that many fewer people were employed in January than in
December, though the two estimates were very different. Non–
seasonally adjusted data from the household survey showed a
loss of 1.56 million jobs in January, of which 472,000 could be
accounted for by a change in the methods used by the BLS to
estimate the total population. This means that well over one mil-
lion fewer people were employed in January than in December
on a seasonally unadjusted basis, according to the household sur-
vey. Meanwhile, the BLS’s survey of employers found a net
employment increase of 36,000 jobs after seasonal adjustment.
Before seasonal adjustment, there was a loss of 2.9 million jobs,
a staggering figure that was not widely reported or commented
on following the release of the BLS data in early February.
Revised January figures that were released in March showed a
much higher payroll increase of 63,000 jobs for the month, but
the unadjusted results were still abysmal after the revision. 
Some may doubt that seasonal adjustment does anything
but obscure actual trends in data series such as those reported
by the BLS. In theory, seasonal adjustment makes data series
more useful as gauges of the economic performance. For exam-
ple, because of the US holiday season, even a mediocre December
for the economy is far better than a good month most other
times of year. Seasonal adjustment can help us see if changes in
unemployment in January reflect an incipient recovery of the
labor market or merely a seasonal blip. Also, there are many pos-
sible explanations of the business cycle, and it is important to
avoid confounding them with seasonal variations that also affect
many economic variables somewhat predictably. Hence, a good
measure of the economy’s health must take into account the fact
that much of the fluctuation in economic data that takes place
over the course of a year results from these changes, and not from
movements  in  the  forces  that  underpin  economic  growth.
However, in examining the January employment report, there is
another way of looking at the choice of seasonally adjusted ver-
sus non–seasonally adjusted data. Whether or not reported job
losses were normal for this time of year, we must keep in mind
that with many fewer jobs and more unemployed people than at
the end of last year, there is an increased need to create job
opportunities. 
How Will the Job Market Slump Come to an End?
Can such a goal be realistic? Our colleagues at the Levy Institute
have done extensive work on various proposals for jobs programs
and on the recent stimulus bills (e.g., Antonopoulos et al. 2010).
From the other side of the debate, there has been much work
criticizing public sector efforts to alleviate job losses in the last
few months. The invective is strong. “New Keynesian” macro-
economist John Taylor (2011) opines, “Why the extraordinarily
high and prolonged unemployment? . . . Discretionary govern-
ment interventions . . . have been largely responsible.” What is
often missed by commentators of all types is the absence of 
any reasonable alternative set of policies to create jobs within the
“free market” paradigm that dominates so much of the nationalPublic Policy Brief, No. 118 12
policy discussion. Some economists suggest structural reforms
to allow unemployed workers to enter industries and occupa-
tions where workers are in high demand. They attribute prob-
lems in the labor market to structural forces such as a mismatch
between the skills needed to qualify for new positions and those
possessed by most of the unemployed. A dubious Paul Krugman
recently looked at the ratio of 2010 unemployment rates to 2007
unemployment rates for various groups of workers. He points
out that “unemployment doubled for every industry, every occu-
pation, every state. Where are the sectors/occupations/regions
gaining jobs? Nowhere to be found” (Krugman 2011). Hence, in
his words, “there is nothing structural” about the run-up in the
unemployment rate that began in 2008. One might also point
out that such a rapid rise in unemployment is rarely the result of
structural shifts in the economy, which usually occur more grad-
ually. Labor market data show every sign of a widespread and
severe weakness in aggregate demand that began to appear only
three to four years ago. In recessions since the 1930s, no remedy
other than macroeconomic policy stimulus has proven to be an
effective means of dealing with weakness in the job market at the
bottom of the business cycle.
The federal budget situation (shown in Figure 11) has
mostly  been  a  focus  of  antigovernment  rhetoric  in  recent
months. On the other hand, better training and education of the
workforce for available jobs is certainly a relevant and important
issue, if not a likely solution to a rapid doubling of the unem-
ployment rate. Also, with educational funding lacking in so many
areas, it is important to point out that part of the remedy for any
mismatches between workers and jobs lies in more and better
public efforts, and certainly not fewer or worse efforts of any
kind. This makes it particularly unfortunate that cuts to educa-
tion are most likely in prospect once a new budget agreement is
hammered  out.  Recent  budget  proposals  by  the  Obama
Administration and congressional Republicans have called for
cuts in Pell Grants and other programs to make training and
education more affordable (Leonhardt 2011). Various other
spending reductions, such as cuts in Medicaid programs, that are
now being considered in most states will also adversely affect
public health, making the unemployed and underemployed less
work ready. 
Drastic cuts in much-needed federal, state, and local pro-
grams will be the order of the day in the United States,as in much
of Europe, unless there is new resolve for effective government
action. Unfortunately, such austerity measures are likely to cause
problems out of proportion to the amount of money saved.
There is no reason to pay such a large price in lost productivity
and human well-being at a time when large deficits are still
needed anyway. Since state and local governments do not have
their own “state monies” and are often constitutionally bound
to balance their budgets, they lack the ability to spend the
amounts of money required to save some of the essential pro-
grams that lie mostly within their bailiwick, rather than that of
the federal government (Hannsgen and Papadimitriou 2010).
Some examples are education, law enforcement, sanitation, pub-
lic transit, public hospitals, and medical programs for the poor.
During the bubble of the 2000s, many state and local govern-
ments grew reliant on the abundant property and sales tax rev-
enues generated by the decade’s hot real estate markets. Over the
last few years, weak tax revenues and increased demand for serv-
ices have resulted in an average budget gap of $140 billion for
the states, and they have managed to cover only about 15 per-
cent of this shortfall by raising taxes and fees on residents (Pollin
and Thompson 2011). Meanwhile, 450,000 jobs in state and local
governments have vanished since 2008, when those levels of gov-
ernment began to fall into fiscal crisis (Norris 2011b). Now the
states will have difficulty replacing the $150 billion in extra fund-
ing that was sent by Washington as part of the 2009 stimulus
package (Lowenstein 2011, 28). Further state tax increases would
hinder the effort to restore full employment and have their great-
est impact on residents of the most economically depressed areas
Figure 11 Federal Deficit and Debt, 2005Q1−2010Q4
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and regions of the country. Additional “revenue sharing” for
states and localities would be a worthwhile and cost-effective
form of new federal spending to aid workers and labor markets,
as James Galbraith (2008) and others point out.   
Such commonsense responses to high unemployment are
resisted by many informed and sophisticated commentators. The
greater part of mainstream economic scholarship suggests that
whenever there is an overall lack of job openings, higher though
perhaps meager levels of employment will eventually be restored
by a natural and orderly decline in real wages and salaries that
encourages employers to increase hiring. Perhaps that is what is
hoped for by observers who oppose QE2 and judicious increases
in government spending. So far, though, there is no strong evi-
dence that the relentless decline in real wages and salaries for
male workers that began perhaps decades ago has accelerated sig-
nificantly since the Great Recession began. It hardly seems likely
that a further decline in real compensation would help even
workers who currently cannot find a job, though wage and salary
reductions are described by many economics textbooks and
some commentators as an inexpensive free-market cure for
involuntary, nonstructural unemployment (Miron 2010). Few
justifications of any kind have even been proposed lately in blogs,
op-ed pieces, and the like for the idea that markets can be
counted on to solve a long-lasting macroeconomic crisis like ours
in the absence of firm monetary stimulus, jobs programs, and
other public sector initiatives. As James Tobin forcefully pointed
out in a 1978 lecture series,
The view that the market system possesses, for unchanging
settings of government policy instruments, strong self-
adjusting mechanisms that assure stability of its full employ-
ment equilibrium is supported neither by theory nor by
capitalism’s long history of economic fluctuations. (Tobin
1980, 46) 
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Notes
1.  Economic projections from the Levy Institute macro model
are featured in Papadimitriou, Hannsgen, and Zezza (2011).
2.  The early-2010 jump in consumer credit shown in the fig-
ure reflects a change in accounting standards that brought
numerous off-balance-sheet items onto the books of US
financial institutions (Federal Reserve 2010). 
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